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Second, quantitative approaches to happiness 
will be considered. Richard Easterlin’s “The 
Economics of Happiness” and Gregg Easter-
brook’s “The Great Story of our Era: Average 
People Better Off” will be used in a discussion of 
the statistical approach to defining happiness. 
The discussion also moves from what we term 
personal happiness to the realm of individual 
measures of happiness. 
In creating a distinction between personal 
happiness and individual happiness, we will as-
1. Introduction
This paper will be divided into three parts. 
First, there will be a discursive analysis of the 
20th century current state of thinking on person-
al happiness as represented in Bertrand Rus-
sell’s Conquest of Happiness, Martin Seligman 
and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s remarks in 
“Positive Psychology: An Introduction” and Dan 
Gilbert’s TED Talk on “The Surprising Science 
of Happiness.” 
doing, that Nussbaum and Ahmed’s inquiries 
provide insights into the role of happiness in re-
dressing international inequalities. 
The 20th Century Current State of Think-
ing on Personal Happiness
2.1 Bertrand Russell’s Conquest of Happiness
Written in 1930, in The Conquest of Happi-
ness, Bertrand Russell, in setting out the scope 
of his examination in “What Makes People Un-
happy?” seeks to limit his focus to personal hap-
piness in particular. Russell comments, “I have 
written before about the changes in the social 
system required to promote happiness. Con-
cerning the abolition of war, of economic ex-
ploitation, of education in cruelty and fear, it is 
not my intention to speak in this volume”1).
Linking the concept of personal happiness as 
a force for promoting international peace, Rus-
sell states that, “To discover a system for the 
avoidance of war is a vital need for our civiliza-
tion; but no such system has a chance while men 
are so unhappy that mutual extermination 
seems to them less dreadful than continued en-
durance of the light of day”2). Linking the con-
cept of personal happiness as a force for the 
eventual promotion of international equality, he 
poses the rhetorical question, “To prevent the 
perpetuation of poverty is necessary if the bene-
fits of machine production are to accrue in any 
degree to those most in need of them; but what 
is the use of making everybody rich if the rich 
themselves are miserable?”3). In advocating the 
necessity of a shift in attitudes for there to be 
the possibility of greater justice and equality, 
Russell quite reasonably and laudably links this 
improvement to personal happiness in the con-
sideration that, “Education in cruelty and fear 
is bad, but no other kind can be given by those 
who are themselves the slaves of these passions. 
sociate particular words with each term. Per-
sonal happiness will be linked to personality, 
character and the ways in which personality 
traits allow for adaptation, synthesis of happi-
ness and for one person to find worthwhile 
something another person might find uninter-
esting.  
We suggest that the notion of individual hap-
piness has the nuance of a more numerical and 
mathematical definition. Individual happiness 
may be regarded as a measure of the attain-
ment of what every member of the group neces-
sarily wants. Models that strive for “aggregate 
happiness” are in this category. In Easterlin’s 
work, for example, individuals, who may not be 
the same individuals surveyed in earlier sam-
ples, are questioned to generate statistical data 
on subjective levels of happiness.  
In this paper, we suggest that the phrase 
“personal happiness” has more of a qualitative 
feel than the phrase “individual happiness” and 
that the following examples convey a flavor of 
this distinction. The concept of character-build-
ing enlightenment whereby one develops one-
self as a human being, both striving to reach 
one’s potential and nurturing one’s sense of so-
cial justice may be seen as a goal in personal 
happiness, as a way each one of us can adjust 
his or her personal standards. Money and mate-
rial wellbeing are often associated with individ-
ual happiness. 
Third, Martha Nussbaum’s “Who Is the Hap-
py Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psy-
chology” and Sara Ahmed’s “Feminist Killjoys” 
The Promise of Happiness will be used in cri-
tiquing earlier approaches to happiness that 
were presented in the first two sections of this 
paper. We will suggest that these go beyond the 
narrow focus of both positive psychology as well 
as the statistical critiques of positive psychology 
and economic measures of wellbeing and, in so 
preoccupation with myself”7). 
While the wish to do good in the world and the 
intention that happiness has a role to play in 
promoting international equality frames Rus-
sell’s remarks on personal happiness, based on 
his suggestion that personal happiness is a pre-
requisite for undertaking “changes in the social 
system,” much of The Conquest of Happiness is 
devoted to helpful advice on achieving personal 
happiness. While the concern may be raised 
that an emphasis on personal satisfaction might 
also sanction selfishness, Russell declares such 
“self-absorption is of various kinds. We may 
take the sinner, the narcissist, and the megalo-
maniac as three very common types”8) and then 
provides detailed examples to demonstrate per-
sonal happiness does not justify selfish behav-
ior.
Russell’s counsel may be regarded as either 
quaint or somewhat historically dated in reflect-
ing the attitude toward women in 1930, but he 
writes with good intention and in an engaging 
manner. Russell’s Conquest is noteworthy due 
to its influence on the humanistic psychology 
movement of the 1960 and 70s and the current 
positive psychology movement. 
The good nature and humanism that infuses 
Russell’s professions of faith on the topic of per-
sonal happiness may be characterized in the fol-
lowing three recommendations. “Fundamental 
happiness depends more than anything else 
upon what may be called a friendly interest in 
persons and things.”9) “To like many people 
spontaneously and without effort is perhaps the 
greatest of all sources of personal happiness.”10)
“The secret of happiness is this: let your inter-
ests be as wide as possible, and let your reac-
tions to the things and persons that interest you 
be as far as possible friendly rather than hos-
tile.”11)
Overall, we endorse Russell’s approach to 
These considerations lead us to the problem of 
[personal happiness (while Russell had here 
used the phrase “the individual” we have substi-
tuted it for “personal” happiness in favor of con-
sistency in this paper)]: what can a man or 
woman, here and now, in the midst of our nos-
talgic society, do to achieve happiness for him-
self or herself?”4)
In limiting his discussion to personal happi-
ness, Russell declares, “My purpose is to sug-
gest a cure for the ordinary day-to-day unhappi-
ness from which most people in civilized 
countries suffer, and which is all the more un-
bearable because, having no obvious external 
cause, it appears inescapable”5). The attitude 
shifts that are necessary—described as one’s 
‘views of the world’—are presented in Russell’s 
assertion, “I believe this unhappiness to be very 
largely due to mistaken views of the world, mis-
taken ethics, mistaken habits of life, leading to 
destruction of that natural zest and appetite for 
possible things upon which all happiness, 
whether of men or animals, ultimately depends. 
These are matters which lie within the power of 
the [person (we are substituting this for the 
word individual)], and I propose to suggest the 
changes by which his happiness, given average 
good fortune, may be achieved”6).
Using personal happiness as a character trait 
or subjective state that may be likened to spiri-
tual enlightenment, or, at least, to a sense of 
selflessness, Russell reflects, “I enjoy life; I 
might almost say that with every year that 
passes I enjoy it more. This is due partly to hav-
ing discovered what were the things that I most 
desired and having gradually acquired many of 
these things. Partly it is due to having success-
fully dismissed certain objects of desire - such as 
the acquisition of indubitable knowledge about 
something or other - as essentially unattain-
able. But very largely it is due to a diminishing 
justice issues and philosophy in addition to psy-
chology, the following scope of operations is pre-
sented: “The field of positive psychology at the 
subjective level is about valued subjective expe-
riences: well-being, contentment, and satisfac-
tion (in the past); hope and optimism (for the 
future); and flow and happiness (in the present). 
At the individual level, it is about positive indi-
vidual traits: the capacity for love and vocation, 
courage, interpersonal skill, aesthetic sensibili-
ty, perseverance, forgiveness, originality, future 
mindedness, spirituality, high talent, and wis-
dom. At the group level, it is about the civic vir-
tues and the institutions that move individuals 
toward better citizenship: responsibility, nur-
turance, altruism, civility, moderation, toler-
ance, and work ethic”14). Certainly, this broad 
definition is useful in the economic approaches 
to happiness that seek to measure subjective as-
sessments of well-being, 
Seeking to distinguish itself from humanistic 
psychology with an appeal to a scientific and 
scholarly rigor positive psychology implies the 
humanistic school lacked, the charge is laid 
that, “one legacy of the humanism of the 1960s 
is prominently displayed in any large bookstore: 
The ‘psychology’ section contains at least 10 
shelves on crystal healing, aromatherapy, and 
reaching the inner child for every shelf of books 
that tries to uphold some scholarly standard”15). 
Further positioning itself as a bastion of schol-
arly rigor, the assertion is made that “positive 
psychology does not rely on wishful thinking, 
faith, self-deception, fads, or hand waving; it 
tries to adapt what is best in the scientific meth-
od to the unique problems that human behavior 
presents to those who wish to understand it in 
all its complexity”16). In what has become a cli-
ché among New Age devotees—the declaration 
“I’m not religious but I am spiritual”—it is note-
worthy to find positive psychology praising spir-
happiness. Its potential benefits and shortcom-
ings will be noted in the conclusion of this paper 
and Russell’s formulation will be compared to 
others through the course of this essay. 
2.2 Positive Psychology Emerges
Seventy years after Russell’s observations on 
the transformative effect personal happiness 
may lead to in the world—the conviction that 
kindness and joy rather than cruelty and fear 
must be the guiding principles and goals of civi-
lization—Martin Seligman and Mihalyi Csiksz-
entmihalyi, in “Positive Psychology: An Intro-
duction”, take up the challenge of advancing 
happiness in a personal way within an empiri-
cal framework. The key points of the positive 
psychology approach to happiness can be sum-
marized as follows.
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi advance the 
field of Positive Psychology in a special edition 
of the prestigious and influential American Psy-
chologist with the following pronouncement: 
“Left alone on the pinnacle of economic and po-
litical leadership, the United States can contin-
ue to increase its material wealth while ignor-
ing the human needs of its people and those of 
the rest of the planet. Such a course is likely to 
lead to increasing selfishness, to alienation be-
tween the more and the less fortunate, and 
eventually to chaos and despair”12). The notion 
of happiness as a force for promoting interna-
tional equality is manifest in this statement.
Further declaring the emergence of their field 
to be a call to action, Seligman and Csikszent-
mihalyi declare “The aim of positive psychology 
is to begin to catalyze a change in the focus of 
psychology from preoccupation only with repair-
ing the worst things in life to also building posi-
tive qualities”13).
In a manner that allows for both quantifica-
tion and seeks to encompass arts, politics, social 
matter what happens, may be exemplified in 
the findings Dan Gilbert offers in his presenta-
tion on “The Surprising Science of Happiness.” 
Gilbert credits the enlargement of the human 
brain, in evolutionary terms, with having en-
dowed people with the capacity to imagine 
events before they occur and also to synthesize 
happiness. He comments on how people imagine 
one flavor is tastier than another without hav-
ing to engage in the unpleasant experience of 
trying the bad-tasting option, yet also cautions 
against the tendency for the simulation to make 
you believe different outcomes are more differ-
ent than they really are or than we expect them 
be. Gilbert terms this error “impact bias” and 
makes the remarkable assertion that, “From 
field studies to laboratory studies, we see that 
winning or losing an election, gaining or losing 
a romantic partner, getting or not getting a pro-
motion, passing or not passing a college test, on 
and on, have far less impact, less intensity and 
much less duration than people expect them to 
have. In fact, a recent study -- this almost floors 
me -- a recent study showing how major life 
traumas affect people suggests that if it hap-
pened over three months ago, with only a few 
exceptions, it has no impact whatsoever on your 
happiness.”19)
It is significant that Gilbert cites experiences 
like major traumas, romantic affiliations and 
receiving promotions because these events—
health, relationships, income—are later consid-
ered in Easterlin’s study. For the time being, we 
may return to Gilbert’s central points on the 
topic of the human aptitude for recovering from 
misfortune and for synthesizing happiness.
Gilbert explains that, “Human beings have 
something that we might think of as a ‘psycho-
logical immune system.’ A system of cognitive 
processes, largely non-conscious cognitive pro-
cesses, that help them change their views of the 
ituality while rejecting faith. In savaging the 
humanistic and New Age psychologies [the lat-
ter of which may be classed as belonging in the 
home remedies and folk wisdom section], posi-
tive psychology appears to be launching a 
pre-emptive strike against what it anticipates 
its critics will most closely compare it to. We 
think the comparison is valid and that Seligman 
and Csikszentmihalyi might have been wiser to 
praise humanistic psychology’s attempts to be 
empirical and distinguish it from New Age en-
tertainment reading.
Lastly, positive psychology makes an appeal 
to medicine and the sciences, commenting that, 
“Science and practice that rely on this world-
view may have the direct effect of preventing 
many of the major emotional disorders. They 
may also have two side effects: They may make 
the lives of clients physically healthier, given all 
that psychologists are learning about the effects 
of mental well-being on the body. This science 
and practice will also reorient psychology back 
to its two neglected missions—making normal 
people stronger and more productive and mak-
ing high human potential actual”17). These ne-
glected missions of traditional psychology will 
be revisited later in this paper in the context of 
Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of Bentham. 
Nussbaum has also taken issue with positive 
psychology’s negative view of unpleasant events 
or states—grief, fear and anger that may never-
theless express love, escape from threat and an 
indignation at injustice18)—and we regard this 
concern as an indication that a wider approach 
to happiness is needed. We will examine the 
merits of such an approach in our discussion of 
Nussbaum in section four below.
2.3 The Synthesis of Happiness
The most recent personal happiness ap-
proaches, that one may be equally happy no 
dents were required to surrender one of their 
two favorite photographic works. Gilbert uses 
his findings to provide proof that, “The psycho-
logical immune system works best when we are 
totally stuck, when we are trapped”24). This is a 
third element—after having a choice and hav-
ing it denied, having no option to reverse one’s 
second choice—that allows for the synthesis of 
happiness. Gilbert explains, “ …here's what's 
really happening. Both right before the swap 
and five days later, people who are stuck with 
that picture, who have no choice, who can never 
change their mind, like it a lot! And people who 
are deliberating – ‘Should I return it? Have I 
gotten the right one? Maybe this isn't the good 
one? Maybe I left the good one?’ – have killed 
themselves. They don't like their picture, and in 
fact even after the opportunity to swap has ex-
pired, they still don't like their picture. Why? 
Because the reversible condition is not condu-
cive to the synthesis of happiness”25).
Gilbert concludes his talk with a remarkably 
normative and status-quo-supporting series of 
assertions. These include the directive to pro-
ceed in a conservative manner, to limit our am-
bitions and to perform duties happily. He says, 
“We should have preferences that lead us into 
one future over another. But when those prefer-
ences drive us too hard and too fast because we 
have overrated the difference between these fu-
tures, we are at risk. When our ambition is 
bounded, it leads us to work joyfully. When our 
ambition is unbounded, it leads us to lie, to 
cheat, to steal, to hurt others, to sacrifice things 
of real value. When our fears are bounded, we're 
prudent; we're cautious; we're thoughtful. When 
our fears are unbounded and overblown, we're 
reckless, and we're cowardly”26). Easy and slow, 
confined to work we must find joyful, mindful of 
others and able to contain our fears are ways we 
adapt to the dominant system. This is a subtext 
world, so that they can feel better about the 
worlds in which they find themselves”20). The ca-
pacity to accept, adapt and adjust [though he 
does not use this exact phrase] is cited by Gil-
bert in presenting the statistical data that re-
veals one’s life satisfaction is no different a year 
after becoming a paraplegic than it is a year af-
ter becoming a multi-millionaire. He further ad-
duces anecdotal data of people who’ve experi-
enced various types of misfortune and have felt 
happier in the long term. 
Introducing his experiments to provide scien-
tific explanation on the process of synthesizing 
happiness, Gilbert comments, “We smirk be-
cause we believe that synthetic happiness is not 
of the same quality as what we might call ‘natu-
ral happiness.’ What are these terms? Natural 
happiness is what we get when we get what we 
wanted, and synthetic happiness is what we 
make when we don't get what we wanted”21). 
Predictably, and in casual terms, Gilbert de-
scribes the results of an experiment in which 
subjects were unable to receive their first choice 
of an art print and were only allowed to make 
their selections from items the experimenter al-
lowed them to have. “Happiness! ‘The one I got 
is really better than I thought! That other one I 
didn't get sucks!’ That's the synthesis of happi-
ness”22).
To provide deeper confirmation that happi-
ness actually can be synthesized, Gilbert repli-
cated the experiment with patients suffering 
from amnesia. He concludes, “What these peo-
ple did when they synthesized happiness is they 
really, truly changed their affective, hedonic, 
aesthetic reactions to that poster. They're not 
just saying it because they own it, because they 
don't know they own it”23). Gilbert provides fur-
ther evidence to support his thesis that happi-
ness can be synthesized by describing another 
forced-choice experiment in which Harvard stu-
of natural human adaptability.
Easterlin sets out to examine well-being in 
terms of inquiries into subjective feelings. Be-
fore embarking on Easterlin’s inquiry, recent 
efforts to find concrete ways by which humans, 
either individually or in groups, can be made 
happy and happier may be examined. Attempts 
to quantify happiness for the purpose of enhanc-
ing happiness have, with the rise of social media 
since the early 2000s, become a popular con-
cern. We feel there are two principal reasons for 
this concern. One is connected with the social 
implications of a feedback mechanism that 
craves simplified data. Information delivered in 
“sound bites” appeals to consumers who desire 
instant expertise through oversimplification. 
The effort to regard each situation anew and 
judge each case on its own merits can be re-
placed with the efforts of economists and psy-
chologists to quantify [even if such quantifica-
tion relies on subjective self-assessments] 
happiness under such monikers as overall satis-
faction with life, general wellbeing and various 
measures of prosperity or material enjoyment. 
We feel the second reason for the examination 
of well-being through inquiries into subjective 
feelings is connected with the political implica-
tions of data that seems to prove people are hap-
pier with one law, policy, candidate or party 
than another. If happiness is defined as “getting 
what one wants” evidence that people are hap-
py, through measures such as a presidential ap-
proval rating, are politically useful. Govern-
ments are ever vigilant in their search for ways 
to appeal to voters and justify their policies. 
Psychologists and economists are pleased to 
generate such data.  
Richard Easterlin, in challenging both econo-
mists and positive psychologists’ approaches to 
happiness, begins by reframing happiness. He 
notes, “Although there are subtle differences be-
of the claim that humans are naturally adaptive 
to the even the worst of situations.
Cementing the notion that people, rather 
than the creation of more just institutions, bear 
the greatest responsibility for creation of happy 
life situations, Gilbert offers the final invocation 
that, “The lesson I want to leave you with from 
these data is that our longings and our worries 
are both to some degree overblown, because we 
have within us the capacity to manufacture the 
very commodity we are constantly chasing”27). 
The words manufacture and commodity are 
significant because they connote a mechanical 
rather than organic structure in Gilbert’s expla-
nation of the synthesis of happiness. Alistair 
Miller, in his critique of positive psychology, 
cites such concepts as behavior management, 
personality categorization, goal orientation and 
life mission as constructs positive psychology 
has appropriated from a range of other disci-
plines and branches of psychology.  Miller ques-
tions the assertions implicit in these concepts 
and concludes disparagingly that, “The model of 
mental health depicted by positive psychology 
turns out to be little more than a caricature of 
an extravert—a bland, shallow, goal-driven ca-
reerist whose positive attitudes, certainties and 
‘high self-esteem’ mask the fact that he lacks 
the very qualities that would enable him to at-
tain a degree of true self-knowledge or wisdom, 
and to really grow as a human being”28).
3 Quantitative Approaches to Happiness
3.1 The Economics of Happiness
Richard Easterlin’s “The Economics of Happi-
ness,” provides a critique of what Gilbert re-
ferred to as the ‘psychological immune system’ 
and undertakes to generally challenge positive 
psychology and happiness psychologists’ notion 
Cantril's survey is strikingly similar. In every 
country, material circumstances, especially ma-
terial living conditions, are mentioned most of-
ten”33). This seems to suggest that conditions of 
greater economic equality, which would have 
the greatest impact on the material conditions 
of existence, would lead to greater happiness. 
Reframed, this suggests a strong, if not recipro-
cally true relationship between happiness and 
international equality. Challenging this conten-
tion is the further statement that Cantril’s sur-
vey also found, “Concerns about broad interna-
tional or domestic issues, such as war, political 
or civil liberty, and social equality, are rarely 
mentioned”34).
This apparent contradiction—that material 
circumstances are most often mentioned and 
yet the concern for social equality is rarely men-
tioned—may stand as an anomaly or may be a 
place where this paper’s earlier distinction be-
tween personal happiness and individual 
happiness is useful. In seeking measurements 
of individual happiness as an aggregate [or “ag-
gregateable” result] the elements of personal 
happiness related to virtues like political or civ-
il liberty and social equality are not appearing.
Tracing the three main areas after material 
circumstances—health, family and money—
people most often cite as important for their 
happiness, Easterlin uses what we may consid-
er to be aggregated longitudinal studies [over 
time, but surveying demographically similar in-
dividuals] in order to determine [from a subjec-
tive assessment perspective] if people maintain 
their set point through hedonic adaptation. In 
reaching the conclusions of no, no and yes, East-
erlin notes, “the evidence does suggest that even 
with adaptation, there is, on average, a lasting 
negative effect of poor health on happiness”35); 
“on average, marriage brings greater happiness, 
marital dissolution, less”36); and that “in the ma-
tween happiness and life satisfaction, I will 
treat them for the present purpose as inter-
changeable measures of overall feelings of 
well-being, that is, of subjective well-being”29). 
One key reason for this conflation of happiness 
with subjective well-being is that it allows East-
erlin to examine both psychology and economics 
under the same rubric. 
Easterlin examines the “set point” notion 
used in the psychology of happiness to assess 
the veracity of the claim that people always re-
turn to their natural equipoise, based on their 
particular genetic or personality characteristics 
in an “adjustment process [called] ‘hedonic ad-
aptation.’ One setpoint theory writer states flat-
ly that life circumstances have a negligible role 
to play in a theory of happiness”30).
Turning to economics, Easterlin notes, “In 
contrast, economics places particular stress on 
the importance of life circumstances—particu-
larly on one's income and employment situa-
tion—to well-being. The view that money makes 
you happier finds ringing endorsement in eco-
nomic theory. The implication is that one can 
improve one’s happiness by getting more mon-
ey, and that public policy measures aimed at 
increasing the income of society as a whole will 
increase well-being”31).
In light of this paper’s interest in exploring 
happiness as a force for promoting international 
equality, Easterlin’s discussion of Hadley Can-
tril’s research is relevant. Easterlin describes 
that, “In the early 1960s, social psychologist 
Hadley Cantril carried out an intensive world-
wide survey in fourteen countries, rich and poor, 
capitalist and communist, asking open-ended 
questions about what people want out of life--
what they would need for their lives to be com-
pletely happy”32). Easterlin reports, “Despite the 
enormous socioeconomic and cultural dispari-
ties among the countries, what people say in 
stay, I can share my findings of the subjective 
assessments of personal happiness residents 
there reported. I was there as staff intermit-
tently over a three-year period and spoke with 
all the practicants, many of whom visited many 
times. In that group, reported happiness in-
creased especially in those who were of advanc-
ing age, had health problems or had suffered 
relationship dissolution. Reported happiness 
increased from year to year and during each vis-
it even when all three conditions were the impe-
tus for an individual's lifestyle choice.
Easterlin’s query addressed whether happi-
ness naturally increased or stayed at a set point 
and how circumstances largely beyond one’s 
control impacted on the set point theory. If 
Easterlin had looked at how happiness might be 
increased through actions and events within 
our control, as suggested in the above example, 
it seems his findings would have yielded a dif-
ferent result.
3.2 Easterbrook and the Paradox of Progress
Gregg Easterbrook’s work is interesting from 
a 2003 perspective and in terms of a discussion 
of the material aspects of being better off and 
the interpretation of the statistics of income and 
wellbeing. 
In the context of challenging the belief that 
increases in income inequality are indicative of 
a socially unjust economic arrangement, East-
erbrook opines “if you torture numbers long 
enough they will confess to anything”40) and fo-
cuses on the low wages of immigrant workers as 
the culprits. “Factor out immigration, and the 
rise in American inequality disappears; median 
income trends become quite healthy”41).
Easterbrook makes two statements. “…take 
into account that it is in the interests of immi-
grants that they be allowed to enter the United 
States—strongly in their interests—and in-
terial goods domain there does appear to be 
complete hedonic adaptation”37).
Easterlin concludes, “The survey evidence in-
dicates that over the life cycle, family and health 
circumstances typically have lasting effects on 
happiness, but that more money does not”38). 
This brings us to the final question of to whom 
Easterlin’s measurements, convincing as they 
are, are actually a revelation. His research does 
provide evidence that most people would agree 
with the following three statements: Yes, I was 
happier when I was healthier and younger. Yes, 
I was happier when I was in a stable long-term 
relationship. No, I wasn’t happier with the less-
er amount of money I was earning in the past 
compared to now.
Easterlin, foremost, is seeking a metric of 
subjective well-being and his final conclusion 
amounts to a one-sentence recommendation. 
“Most people could increase their happiness by 
devoting less time to making money, and more 
time to nonpecuniary goals such as family life 
and health”39). While this advice is not exactly 
surprising, Easterlin’s examination of the theo-
ries both the psychology of happiness and eco-
nomic measures of happiness present regarding 
subjective well-being is illuminating. It must 
also be noted that he created an aggregate sce-
nario to assess individual happiness. What if 
Easterlin had compared, for example, people 
who do yoga with his random sample? What if 
Easterlin had only surveyed yogis? 
Matthieu Ricard, in his TED talk on The hab-
its of happiness, discussed his ‘sample group’ 
who were focusing on happiness as a quieting of 
the mind and openness to universal love. His 
‘findings’ were informed by the experiences of 
monks meditating on mountaintops in the Hi-
malayas. Recalling my months in an ashram in 
the Bahamas, where the requirement of “prac-
ticing contentment” was a condition of one’s 
wellbeing and presents statistics to support the 
assertion that the “equalizing of education be-
tween rich and average is just as striking”47).
Easterbrook’s final “examples of average-rich 
convergence”48) cite statistics on leisure and 
work time. Increases in the percentage of aver-
age Americans using air travel, staying in ho-
tels and eating in restaurants are used to 
demonstrate equalization in leisure activities. 
Easterbrook claims the fact that over 50 percent 
of Americans are employed in office settings 
where “the typical person’s occupational injury 
concerns are now carpal tunnel syndrome from 
typing rather than lost limbs from stamping 
presses or lost eyesight from sewing in low 
light—numbers among the most impressive so-
cial accomplishments in human history”49).
It is noteworthy that the statistical data is in-
terpreted to suggest changes in technology, 
commerce and production amount to social ac-
complishments. If Easterbrook had presented 
this particular one of “the most impressive so-
cial accomplishments in human history” as also 
being incidental rather than planned the nu-
ance of this being some type of supreme human-
itarian effort would be further dispelled. 
Easterbrook presents two suggestions as to 
why happiness does not increase even though 
prosperity has. He terms one “the ‘revolution of 
satisfied expectations,’ meaning that now we 
have so much it’s hard to look forward to more”50)
and the other as ‘collapse anxiety’51), by which 
he means people fear their present level of com-
fort is unsustainable. 
In an earlier aside, Easterbrook had com-
mented on how “there is nothing wrong, and 
much right, with seeking utmost comfort; the 
only real objection is that billions around the 
world have far more basic needs that go un-
met”52). Content to continue presenting further 
evidence of American prosperity, he advises, 
equality-gap statistics, though always a con-
cern, cease to be an indictment of the American 
economy”42). In the next sentence, he makes a 
statement that is not necessarily a given. “Stat-
ed in the opposite way, if the existence of an in-
equality gap is an indictment of the American 
economy, then the solution is to forbid immigra-
tion”43). In this case it is just as plausible to say, 
‘If the existence of an inequality gap is an in-
dictment of the American economy, then the 
solution is to remove these inequalities.’
More stridently, Easterbrook challenges, 
“Unless you favor the closing of borders, don’t 
complain that the top is pulling away from the 
middle in income terms.”44) Reflecting on the 
earlier comments of Russell, there is every rea-
son to complain that denying others the good 
chance at a better life diminishes one’s personal 
happiness. Again, Easterbrook’s notion that the 
presence of underpaid immigrants rather than 
the underpayment of immigrants is the real 
problem, is an elitist we/they framing of the 
problem of income inequalities.
Easterbrook comments on health care spend-
ing in noting that older Americans complain 
about prescription medication costs but ought to 
be thankful for the benefits of those medications 
in the form of increased longevity and better 
health. Easterlin says, “One reason so many 
American senior citizens are at this writing up-
set about the costs of prescription drugs is that 
those drugs have kept them alive long enough 
that they need more drugs”45). An earlier point 
Richard Easterlin made about decline in health 
leading to a reduction in happiness would sug-
gest that the prosperity that “buys for America’s 
citizens ever longer lives with more vigor and 
less pain”46), would enhance feelings of wellbe-
ing and happiness.
Easterbrook discusses rising housing stan-
dards as an indicator of an increase in material 
ache is very different from the pain of losing a 
loved one to death”58). Nussbaum criticizes, “Nor 
was Bentham worried about interpersonal com-
parisons, a problem on which economists in the 
Utilitarian tradition have spent great labor, 
and one that any program to use subjective sat-
isfaction for public policy must face”59).
Noting Bentham’s willingness to engage in 
cross-species comparisons, Nussbaum com-
ments, “One of the most attractive aspects of his 
thought is its great compassion for the suffering 
of animals, which he took to be unproblemati-
cally comparable to human suffering”60). Nuss-
baum objects that, “Bentham sees no problem in 
extending the comparison class to the entire 
world of sentient animals”61). Nussbaum further 
comments, “Bentham cannot be said to have de-
veloped anything like a convincing account of 
pleasure and pain, far less of happiness”62).
Nussbaum uses the phrase “strident simplici-
ty” to characterize Bentham’s thinking when 
perhaps unapologetic simplicity would be more 
accurate. In Bentham’s time ‘greatest good for 
the greatest number’ may have been a sensible 
approach to happiness and, as Nussbaum ac-
knowledges, he was more concerned with the 
alleviation of suffering than the creation of hap-
piness, perhaps being willing to let people cre-
ate happiness for themselves while doing the 
work of trying to remove the obstacles to happi-
ness. It seems, if one reflects back to the happi-
ness psychologists’ concern with “making nor-
mal people stronger and more productive and 
making high human potential actual”, there is 
still merit in Bentham’s approach.
Nussbaum writes Aristotle seeks qualitative 
distinctions of pleasure but problematically “of-
fers two very different conceptions of pleasure”: 
the “first identifies pleasure with unimpeded 
activity”63) and the “second, and probably better, 
account holds that pleasure is something that 
“We should simply recognize, and feel grateful 
for, what this reflects about ever higher [nation-
al] living standards”53).
While Easterbrook does not question the im-
plications of ignoring the unmet basic needs of 
billions of others, he does suggest that collapse 
anxiety is irrational. Ending on a hollow-sound-
ing happy note, Easterbrook considers “if a col-
lapse were coming, its signs ought to be some-
where. That is not what trends show. Practically 
everything is getting better”54). Though Easter-
brook has equated happiness with material 
wellbeing, the conflation is problematic since it 
both ignores the sufferings of those whose basic 
needs are unmet and relies on the explanation 
that those who fail to be happy amidst abun-
dance do so for primarily irrational reasons.
4. Happiness in Advancing International 
Equality
4.1 Nussbaum’s Critique
Martha Nussbaum, in setting out to examine 
conceptual issues a psychology of happiness 
must take into account, begins with the consid-
eration of pleasure and poses the question, “is it 
a sensation, or is it something more like a way 
of attending to the world, or even a way of being 
active”55)? In exploring the first possibility, 
Nussbaum cites Mill in critiquing Bentham and 
informs us, “Mill writes in his great essay “On 
Bentham,” [that] “Bentham failed in deriving 
light from other minds.’ [and that] For him 
[Bentham], pleasure simply must be a single ho-
mogeneous sensation, containing no qualitative 
differences”56).
Nussbaum says the “reason for this problem 
is that Bentham’s deepest concern is with pain 
and suffering”57) and Nussbaum argues for a 
physical versus psychological distinction in 
types of pain, noting that the “pain of a head-
likely be turned toward comfort and relief—that 
nearby are others with whom we share loving 
care and that the Universe has decided we are 
ready to return to it. If we’re in pain or unable to 
quiet our fears of the unknown, comfort and re-
lief may be provided by pain-killers or psycho-
tropic medications and these may reasonably 
been regarded as a form of happiness.
Nussbaum focuses on the discussion of the in-
commensurable nature of satisfaction, but also 
notes a common theme—that if one is feeling 
satisfied that’s really a “herd-like feeling of sat-
isfaction”69) and should alert us that that’s the 
very time one ought to think ‘oh no, I’m just 
resting on my laurels and better get busy to 
meet another challenge.’ “When we notice that 
happiness is complex, we are prepared to face 
yet a further question in connection with its 
proper analysis: does happiness require self-ex-
amination”70)? Nussbaum here seems to suggest 
the answer is yes and that we should, in an Ar-
istotelian manner, aspire to be “More skilful in 
self-knowledge”71). In this case, self-knowledge 
may be regarded as an aspiration toward a 
“higher and nobler or finer” form of happiness. 
It may also be the case that there is a deeper 
happiness that accompanies pleasure and satis-
faction which continues even when we don’t de-
clare, “this is pleasurable and satisfying” at the 
time we’re involved in a deeper happiness.
On the question ‘what is happiness?’ Nuss-
baum writes, “Aristotle thought: that activity is 
far and away the main thing, and that pleasure 
will normally crop up in connection with doing 
good activities without struggle, the way a vir-
tuous person does them”72). Nussbaum also sug-
gests that Aristotle “implies, too, that it would 
be totally mistaken to pry the pleasure apart 
from the activity and seek it on its own”73). While 
the first thought may be true, the implication 
may not be true unreservedly. We contend that 
comes along with, supervenes on [that unex-
pectedly changes the quality of], activity”64). 
Nussbaum refers to “Mill thinking of pleasures 
as very like activities (with Aristotle in Book 
VII) or, with Aristotle in Book X, as experiences 
so closely linked to activities that they cannot be 
pursued apart from them” and that “the unity of 
the Benthamite calculus has been thrown out, 
to be replaced by a variegated conception, in-
volving both sensation and activity, and promi-
nently including qualitative distinctions”65). 
Nussbaum concludes this consideration saying, 
“Moreover, any experiment that simply as-
sumes pleasure to be a hedonic state, something 
like a sensation, would also be inadequate, say 
Mill and Aristotle, to the complexity of human 
experience, since people agree that activity mat-
ters”66). We may respond that, yes, the complex-
ity of human experience is real. However, it 
would be hopelessly subjective and highly anec-
dotal to feel each experience was unique and 
incomparable. Isn’t it more desirable to be able 
to spot patterns of similarities from which to 
say that these factors seem to go together? Isn’t 
it useful to be able to identify factors that indi-
viduals associate with happiness when asked 
simple questions like “what makes you feel hap-
py or are you generally happy with your life?”
Nussbaum responds, “The fact that people 
answer such questions hardly shows that this is 
the way that they experience their lives”67). 
Nussbaum speaks about how it seems inappro-
priate to speak of the satisfaction or pleasure 
one might feel on one’s deathbed to criticize the 
phrase “satisfied with one’s life overall”68). Is it a 
valid criticism for Nussbaum to say that on 
one’s deathbed one may not be speaking of life 
satisfaction? It is more likely, we contend, that 
one would focus on how one feels about the im-
pending event of death. Instead of talking about 
satisfaction or pleasure, the focus might more 
pears more in Easterbrook’s comments above 
than in  Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s intro-
duction to positive psychology, does bolster a 
system of structural inequalities.
Nussbaum concludes that, “Public policy 
should also focus on the mitigation of the sort of 
pain that is not an enrichment of the soul or a 
deepening of self-knowledge, and there is a lot 
of pain that is not conducive to anything good”79)
and that “the appeal to subjective well-being, as 
currently used in the psychological literature, is 
not utterly useless, but at present it is so rid-
dled with conception confusion and normative 
naivete  that we had better pause and sort 
things out before going any further”80).
While Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabili-
ties document only appears in her article as Ap-
pendix B, it is nevertheless a key indication of 
her concept of human nature and a call for ac-
tion to increases human capabilities. Nuss-
baum’s ten Central Human Capabilities catego-
ries are: 1. Life, 2. Bodily Health, 3. Bodily 
Integrity, 4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought, 
5. Emotions, 6. Practical Reason, 7. Affiliation 
A. Being able to live with and toward others B. 
Having the social bases of self-respect and non-
humiliation, 8. Other Species, 9. Play, 10. Con-
trol over One’ s Environment A. Political B. Ma-
terial.81)
Nussbaum’s reflections on happiness do pro-
mote internationalism and her Central Human 
Capabilities may be appreciated as a real-world 
plan that would allow people to determine their 
own happiness rather than imposing a vision of 
happiness on them. Nussbaum’s scheme is 
predicated on a belief that people really do have 
the capacity to choose.
4.2 Ahmed’s Critique
The principal theme in Sara Ahmed’s “Femi-
nist Killjoys” The Promise of Happiness, is in 
some pleasures on their own might simply be 
other kinds of happiness. The mere act of refer-
ring to some pleasures as “higher pleasures” 
connotes others as “lower pleasures” from which 
we may also derive some form of happiness. For 
example, people may sometimes just want to be 
entertained with light comedy instead of deeply 
thoughtful drama. Knowing one has chosen a 
lower pleasure as an indulgence may also be a 
way of acknowledging the need to choose better 
and higher pleasures more often. It may be a 
way of acknowledging that humans are highly 
inconsistent and that higher and lower plea-
sures heighten one’s appreciation of a wider 
range of happiness experiences.
Examining normative questions of a psychol-
ogy of happiness under the heading of bad plea-
sures and good pains, Nussbaum comments 
that, “bad people have pleasure in their bad be-
havior”74) and we must appreciate this is too 
simple a statement. Racists and other bad peo-
ple do not often acknowledge the label and most 
often feel their behavior is good behavior. Nuss-
baum reiterates Rousseau’s point that, “To the 
extent that privileged groups live a charmed life 
and insulate themselves from the sufferings of 
the poor, everyone is missing out on happiness, 
since they are all living in a bad unjust world”75)
and asks, “Does Seligman’s positive psychology 
risk pushing already hubristic Americans in the 
direction of even greater hubris”76)? We feel that 
it does. In tentative answer to this question, 
Nussbaum notes that, “deferring to the subjec-
tive experience of pleasure or satisfaction will 
often bias the social inquiry in the direction of 
an unjust status quo”77). While the goals of posi-
tive psychology are outlined as being “about the 
civic virtues and the institutions that move in-
dividuals toward better citizenship: responsibil-
ity, nurturance, altruism, civility, moderation, 
tolerance, and work ethic78), the hubris that ap-
up over happiness”88).
Citing Marilyn Frye, Ahmed observes how 
“happiness becomes the expected ‘default’ posi-
tion for those who are oppressed, such that it 
comes to define the sphere of neutrality. You are 
either happy: or you are not”89).
Ahmed makes the point “that feminists are 
read as being unhappy, such that situations of 
conflict, violence, and power are read as about
the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being 
what feminists are unhappy about”90).
The discussion Ahmed engages in, which is a 
version of the tautology “to speak out is to be 
labeled as outspoken”, is truthful and compel-
ling. It is also, though unstated by Ahmed, a 
revelation of the technique used to shut down 
discussion on a topic by focusing on the speaker 
rather than the content.
The following example is typical of a “shut-
ting down discussion” exchange. I am upset 
with this condition versus this condition is up-
setting. Both constructions are problematic. 
The former focuses on the upset of the speaker. 
The respondent may then ignore the upsetting 
condition in favor of counseling the speaker out 
of his or her upset. The latter statement, that 
“this condition is upsetting”, may be met with 
the request for the speaker to ‘take ownership’ 
of his or her feelings and again defocus on the 
condition
Ahmed feels that, “for a life to count as a good 
life, it must take on the direction promised as a 
social good, which means imagining one’s futu-
rity in terms of reaching certain points along a 
life course. If happiness is what allows us to 
reach certain points, it is not necessarily how 
you feel when you get there”91).
Echoing Gilbert’s notion that happiness in-
volves a process of adjustment, Ahmed speaks 
of feminism that holds up “the concept of alive-
ness … as an alternative social value to happi-
not allowing others to define one’s happiness. 
Ahmed explores this theme with complex in-
sight and incisiveness. It is also characterized 
by and may be regarded as an expansion of the 
perception Ahmed shares that “The political 
plea of [Mary Wollstonecraft in] Vindication [of 
the Rights of Women] is against the right of men 
to decide what happiness means for women”82).
Ahmed states that, “happiness is used as a 
technology or instrument, which allows the re-
orientation of individual desire toward a com-
mon good”83) and that definitions based on gen-
der are basically “happiness scripts”84) that 
prescribe the required actions and reactions in 
particular situations. The necessity of going 
along with these scripts is defined as how one 
must get along with others. The obligation to be 
happy may take the form of “simply approxi-
mating the signs of being happy—passing as 
happy—in order to keep things in the right 
place”85).
Ahmed contends that, “the history of femi-
nism is thus a history of making trouble, a his-
tory of women … refusing to make others hap-
py”86). In an analysis of George Eliot’s The Mill 
on the Floss, Ahmed discusses how when the 
female character, Maggie, is viewed as a trou-
blemaker for speaking out in concern for her 
parents, this reveals “the relationship between 
consciousness of injustice and being attributed 
as the cause of unhappiness”87).
Ahmed speaks of how a questioning or rejec-
tion of conventions, though they may impose 
conditions of unjust inequality, is characterized 
as a source of unhappiness. “Feminists by de-
claring themselves as feminists are already 
read as destroying something that is thought of 
by others not only as being good but as the cause 
of happiness. The feminist killjoy ‘spoils’ the 
happiness of others; she is a spoilsport because 
she refuses to convene, to assemble, or to meet 
cause”98).
These points about happiness are connected 
with an approach to happiness that examines 
the need for people to define their own happi-
ness rather than to have happiness defined for 
them. Implied in the quest for equality and re-
dress of social injustice is the upset of conven-
tional standards that require happy house-
wives, grateful and smiling servants and a 
variety of other attributes imposed on oppressed 
peoples.
5. Conclusions
In relating the approaches to happiness brief-
ly surveyed in this paper to the concept of hap-
piness as a force for promoting international 
equality, the following points of convergence 
and divergence may be appreciated.
From Bertrand Russell’s assertion that per-
sonal happiness is necessary before one feels 
inclined to take action toward world peace, 
through to the hopes of positive psychology in 
improving the capacity for high human poten-
tial and in preventing the world from devolving 
into chaos and despair, to Dan Gilbert’s at-
tempts to demonstrate humanity’s natural psy-
chological immune system, the flow from per-
sonal happiness to an individually measurable 
synthesis of happiness was explored in the first 
section of this paper.
Analysis of Russell’s advice on personal hap-
piness reveals its link to social justice issues 
such as the cessation of war and the promotion 
of international harmony. The merits in this ar-
gument are in the belief that one’s personal 
happiness is tied to wellbeing in the world and 
that personal happiness is ultimately rooted in 
taking an intense interest outside one’s own im-
mediate selfish concerns. The challenge in Rus-
sell’s approach is that while it does express a 
ness”92). Ahmed explains that, “Behind this ar-
gument is a critique of the concept of adjustment, 
of how happiness demands adjusting your body 
to a world that has already taken shape”93).
Ahmed, after discussion of how the illusions 
of happiness “can also work to conceal the caus-
es of hurt”94), cites Audre Lorde on “happiness as 
an obscurant: ‘Let us seek ‘joy’ rather than real 
food and clean air and a saner future on a liv-
able earth! As if happiness alone can protect 
from the results of profit-madness”95).
The need for an internationalist perspective, 
for engagement with the world is revealed in 
the statement that the critique of happiness 
[from the “feminist killjoy” perspective of need-
ing to engage with issues wider than the pre-
tense to happiness], is demonstrated in the fol-
lowing passage. “We can now see how you can 
retrieve a model of false consciousness in cri-
tiquing claims to happiness. You would not be 
saying ‘you are wrong, you are not happy, you 
just think you are as you have a false belief.’ 
Rather you would be saying there is something 
false about our consciousness of the world”96).
Ahmed concludes with a pronouncement on 
how happiness can be used. She says, “We learn 
to see what is concealed by signs of happiness. 
You can cause unhappiness merely by noticing 
something. And if it can cause unhappiness 
merely to notice something, you realize that the 
world you are in is not the world you thought 
you were in. Feminism becomes a kind of es-
trangement from the world and thus involves 
moments of self-estrangement. Our feminist ar-
chive is an archive of unhappiness even though 
the threads of unhappiness do not weave our 
stories together”97).
Ahmed ends with the invocation that “we can 
recognize not only that we are not the cause of 
the unhappiness that has been attributed to us 
but also the effects of being attributed as the 
ness is that the notion of a psychological im-
mune system has enormous appeal. The set 
point theory is like a restating of the common-
place wish to have the courage to change what 
can be changed, strength to endure what can’t 
be changed and wisdom to know the difference 
between the two. In terms of Gilbert’s presenta-
tion, the wisdom is in knowing that within three 
months of even the worst event there is no dif-
ference between the two. This “knowing” consti-
tutes a belief that must be of great comfort to 
individuals who have suffered terrible losses or 
life challenges. In encouraging people to believe 
“I will be happy no matter what happens” we 
feel there is a benefit. To persevere one must 
have the energy to overcome obstacles and to 
whatever degree Gilbert’s approach to happi-
ness helps others keep up their positive energy 
there is a real benefit. Insofar as Gilbert’s ap-
proach contributing to an internationalist world 
view and equalizing inequalities, the exact op-
posite may be the effect. That is to say, Gilbert’s 
examples and experiments seem best suited to 
individuals who are prosperous enough to un-
dertake the actions—whether that means start-
ing over after having lost one’s fortune or engag-
ing in treatment after having been rendered 
paraplegic—more open to individuals in the de-
veloped world. The subtext is that one ought to 
use the resources that one has in order to adjust 
as completely as one is able to adjust and ex-
press the good wishes that others are able to do 
the same. By locating the responsibility for hap-
piness in the individual, Gilbert’s approach 
sidesteps the question of whether giving all oth-
ers in the world a chance for happiness is in any 
way connected with one’s own happiness. In-
stead, the only balm given to sooth inequalities 
is that all humans should learn to develop their 
psychological immune system to synthesize 
happiness in whatever condition they may be.
beneficent attitude toward humanity and the 
amelioration of international inequalities, this 
is not accompanied by a systematic or program-
matic approach that might be employed to cre-
ate specific public policy to redress inequalities.
The merit of the positive psychology approach 
presented by Martin Seligman and Mihalyi 
Csikszentmihalyi is in its stated goal to change 
public policy in a way that does seek to prevent 
the world from lapsing into chaos and despair 
and clearly enunciates that the privileged posi-
tion of the United States and, by implication, 
other industrially developed nations does carry 
with it a responsibility to help less fortunate 
places develop their human joy and potential. 
The potential benefit of this shift in focus and 
duty is immense. By expanding the field of psy-
chology beyond the treatment of psychological 
problems and into the realm of expanding hu-
man potential and social responsibility positive 
psychology has to improve the world, the promo-
tion of international equality must figure into 
the equation. The challenges in positive psy-
chology are twofold: The first is that the need 
for operational terms, where measures used are 
clearly defined, must also lead to a situation 
where positive psychology researchers are im-
posing their definition of happiness on others. 
The second challenge in an empirical approach 
to happiness is that in seeking methods of indi-
vidual measurement of “hedonic adjustment”, 
the “natural psychological immune system” or 
the contention that people invariably return to 
a set point of contentment in various experi-
mental proofs which generate statistical evi-
dence of its veracity—the role of the individual 
is the focus and issues of structural inequality 
are ignored. 
One example of this practice is shown in Dan 
Gilbert’s presentation on the science of happi-
ness. The benefit of Gilbert’s approach to happi-
doesn’t categorically state that diminishing in-
equalities internationally increases one’s happi-
ness.
One of the shortcomings in Easterbrook’s ar-
gument is that he does not question the implica-
tions of ignoring the unmet basic needs of bil-
lions of others. It is, however, useful that he 
raises this issue even to ignore it. Anyone read-
ing Easterbrook, noting what short shrift he 
gives this concern, may then consider how the 
unmet basic needs of billions of others do serve 
to diminish happiness.
This paper’s third section begins with a dis-
cursive exploration of Martha Nussbaum’s cri-
tique of personal happiness and individual hap-
piness notions. Nussbaum examines Bentham’s 
attempts to quantify happiness and Aristotle’s 
approach in examining the quality of happiness 
as virtue. Nussbaum's 10 human conditions ex-
tends this discussion to indicate that qualitative 
standards for all—which include rights not to be 
deprived of the minimum freedoms necessary 
for self-determination of happiness from a per-
sonal happiness definition and the minimum 
material necessities for the pursuit of economic 
wellbeing on a global scale—offer the best hope 
for promoting equality in the world. This is the 
internationalist perspective that is implicitly 
echoed in Sara Ahmed’s critique of the how a 
dominant group’s imposition of their notion of 
happiness on those who are subjugated calls for 
a reevaluation of the consciousness of happi-
ness. Whenever the right to self-determination 
in both senses [in determining what the self is 
and in constructing one’s own personal happi-
ness] is denied to any group or class—women or 
immigrants or poorer people—the happiness in 
the world is diminished. Happiness denied to 
others in the world truly does question the au-
thenticity of individual happiness. Ahmed con-
cludes that the “Feminist Killjoy” is simply 
The second section of this paper, through the 
consideration of Richard Easterlin’s work, pro-
vided a critique of the “set point reversion” con-
cept in positive psychology and of the approach 
to happiness that seeks to quantify the experi-
ence of happiness as a measure of subjective 
wellbeing. Further discussion of the challenge 
in equating material wellbeing with happiness 
was provided in Gregg Easterbrook’s work. Eas-
terbrook’s notions of the difficulty in imagining 
ever-greater prosperity and the fear that pres-
ent prosperity may implode under the weight of 
its own success—which he respectively terms 
the revolution of satisfied expectations and col-
lapse anxiety—may also be framed as the prob-
lem of equating economic wellbeing with per-
sonal happiness. Reflecting on Russell’s 
observations and anticipating Martha Nuss-
baum and especially Sara Ahmed’s objections, 
Easterbrook’s “paradox of prosperity” may be 
interpreted as indicative of the rift between the 
statistical measurement of individual happi-
ness and the world-consciousness necessary for 
meaningful personal happiness.
Richard Easterlin, in critiquing the psycho-
logical-happiness-is-“hard-wired” claim, up-
dates Hadley Cantril’s study that took place 
more than 40 years ago and presents evidence 
that happiness does require more than develop-
ing the ability to return to one’s set point of he-
donic adaptation. The benefit of this challenge 
is that material living conditions—which, in 
Easterlin’s research, also include health and re-
lationships—are demonstrated to be relevant to 
happiness and inequalities in these conditions 
are shown to diminish happiness. Speculative 
analysis of these findings suggests the extrapo-
lation that expanding one’s relationships to in-
clude “doing good in the world” would increase 
one’s happiness. The shortcoming of Easterlin’s 
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pointing out the illusion to destroy the false-re-
ality of female emancipation under the heading 
of the happy housewife or colonialism implicit 
in the notion of the happy immigrant.
Both Nussbaum’s formulation of a template 
for universal personal happiness—as embodied 
in the Central Human Capabilities—and 
Ahmed’s repudiation of the ways subjugating 
notions of happiness has been historically ap-
plied and must be reformulated demonstrate 
the potential of happiness as a force for promot-
ing international equality.
This paper was written in the main by 
Lawrence Karn, with the very kind assistance 
and support of Takahiko Hattori.
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